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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE 
STATE OF UTAH 
CHARLES ALVIN KENNEDY, 
Plaintiff-Appellant, 
v. 
LAWRENCE MORRIS, Warden, 
Utah State P risen, 
Case No. 
17617 
Defendant-Respondent. 
BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF THE CASE 
The plaintiff-appellant, CHARLES ALVIN KENNEDY, appeals 
from an order in the Third Judicial District Court, Salt Lake 
County, State of Utah, entered by the Honorable Christine M. 
Durham, Judge, denying, after hearing, appellant's Petition 
for Writ of Habeas Corpus. 
DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT 
The above-entitled matter having come on regularly for hear-
ing in the above-entitled Court on Thursday, the 29th day of 
January, 1981, before the Honorable Christine M. Durham, Judge, 
on appellant's Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus, and the appel-
lant being sworn and testifying to the allegations of his Petition, 
the Court having heard his testimony and having received copies 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
of the trial transcript of appellant's criminal proceeding, and 
having heard and received testimony and evidence from respond-
ent, and having reviewed all exhibits submitted by the respective 
parties, and having considered the respective memorandums of law 
submitted by the parties and having taken the matter under ad-
visement the Court ordered that appellant's Petition for Writ of 
Habeas Corpus be denied. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
The appellant seeks an order granting his Petition for Writ 
of Habeas Corpus, and in the alternative he seeks a reversal of 
the Trial Court's order that denied his Petition for Writ of 
Habeas Corpus. 
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS 
Appellant was charged by amended information with two 
counts of forceable sexual abuse, in violation of Utah Code Anno-
tated Section 76-5-404, 1953 as amended. The charge was based 
on appellant's alleged causing of other persons to take indecent 
liberties with appellant's then wife with the intent to arouse the 
appellant's sexual desires. Appellant was arrested following the 
filing of the information and at all times pertinent hereto was in-
carcerated in the Juab County Jail. That during said incarcera-
tion he was given medication to sedate him. 
- 2 -
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Greg Warner of the Utah County Legal Defender's Office was 
appointed to represent appellant in connection with the charge. 
A preliminary hearing was held on September 13, 1979, and peti-
tioner was bound over to stand trial in the Fourth Judicial 
Distnct Court for Juab County. 
That on or about November 21, 1979, while appearing before 
the Honorable Allen B. Sorenson, Judge of the Fourth Judicial 
District, on motions pertaining to appellant's case, Mr. Warner 
requested a non-jury trial. Appellant, CHARLES A. KENNEDY, was 
not present at the foregoing hearing that was held in Provo, Utah. 
Appellant was first informed of the actions taken by Mr. 
Warner on Saturday evening, the 24th day of November, 1979, at 
a conference between he and Mr. Warner that took place at the 
jail house. There is dispute as to whether Mr. Warner at that 
time counselled appellant concerning his constitutional right to 
trial by jury. Appellant has testified he had not been so counsel-
led, they had not discussed the matter previously and he had no 
independent knowledge of the significance of the constitutional 
right to trial by jury. 
The Court Transcript of the trial proceedings of November 
27, 1979, at page 3, sets forth the Court's inquiry of counsel as 
to what explanation, if any, he had given appellant about appel-
lant's constitutional right to trial by jury. In addition, the 
Court made inquiry directly of appellant concerning the purported 
- 3 -
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waiver of his constitutional right to trial by jury, but the Court 
gave no explanation as to, and to use the language of the Court, 
"explained to him (appellant) the full significance of that right'" 
No prospective jurors were summoned for the trial scheduled 
November 27, 1979. 
The Court, Honorable Allen B. Sorenson, Judge, presiding, 
found appellant guilty as charged and on January 4, 1980, appel-
lant was sentenced to two concurrent terms of zero to five years 
and committed to the Utah State Prison. Appellant appealed the 
conviction to the Utah Supreme Court. The Supreme Court affirmed 
the judgment of the District Court in State v. Kennedy, Utah, 616 
P2d 588 (1980). 
The appellant on the 10th day of December, 1980, filed a 
Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus. The issues raised in the in-
stant proceeding were not raised on direct appeal. 
Appellant's Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus was tried be-
fore the Third District Court, the Honorable Christine M. Durham, 
Judge, presiding on January 29, 1981, and the Court taken the 
matter under advisement ruled that appellant had not met his 
burden of showing that his waiver of trial by jury was involun-
tary or unknowing. Appellant appealed to the above-entitled Court 
for relief sought in his Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus or re-
versal of the Trial Court ruling. 
- 4 -
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ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
APPELLANT'S APPROPRIATE REMEDY IS A WRIT 
OF HABEAS CORPUS. 
A Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus is an extraordinary 
remedy pursuant to Rule 65B(f), et sec, Utah Rules of Civil Pro-
cedure, which provides in pertinent part as follows: 
( i) any person imprisoned in the penitentiary 
or county jail under commitment of any court, 
whether such imprisonment be under an origi-
nal commitment or under a commitment for vio-
lation of probational parole, who asserts that 
any proceedings which resulted in his commit-
ment there was an underlying substantial de-
nial of his rights under the constitution of 
the United States or the State of Utah, or 
both, may institute proceedings under this 
Rule (emphasis added). 
The foregoing language is absent of any condition precedent 
of a requirement that the issues raised pursuant to said rule re-
quires that a direct appeal be exhausted before one seeks reme-
dies thereunder. 
Notwithstanding the foregoing, a Writ of Habeas Corpus is 
properly invoked when the Court has jurisdiction over the person 
or the offense, or the requirements of law have been so disregard-
ed that the party is substantially and effectively denied due 
process of law, or where such fact is shown that it would be un-
conscionable not to re-examine the conviction. See Bryant v. 
I.:!_rner, 19 U2d 284, 431 P2d 121 (1967), Helmuth v. Morris, 598 
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P2d 333 (Utah, 1979), Gentry v. Smith, 600 P2d 1008 (Utah, 1979!. 
The Utah Supreme Court has steadfastly proclaimed that a 
Habeas Corpus proceeding is not a substitute for an appeal save 
and except a Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus is appropriate 
in the event of the following: 
a claim of fundamental unfairness in 
the trial or a substantial prejudicial denial 
of a persons constitutional rights. (See Chess 
v. Smith, 617 P2d 341, 343 (Utah, 1980) ,----arid 
MoriShrta v. Morris, 621 P2d 691 (Utah, 1980). 
Appellant in the instant case has been substantially and 
effectively denied his constitutional right to trial by jury. The 
appellant's right to trial by jury is a fundamental right protect-
ed both by the United States and Utah Constitutions. 
It is submitted that upon review the Court should find that 
the proceedings rose to the level of fundamental unfairness, ap-
pellant was denied substantially and effectively his constitutional 
rights and it would be unconscionable not to allow appellant his 
remedy as to said issues by Writ of Habeas Corpus. 
POINT II 
APPELLANT HAS A FUNDAMENTAL CONSTITUTIONAL 
RIGHT TO A TRIAL BY JURY. 
The right to trial by jury is guaranteed by the Sixth and 
Fourteenth Amendments of the United States Constitution, Article 
1, Section 10 of the Constitution of Utah and Section 77-27-1 Utah 
Code Annotated, 1953 as amended, and said right has been con-
- 6 -
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strued by the applicable case law as a fundamental Federal Con-
stitutional Right. 
The application of the Sixth Amendment to the United States 
Const1tution guaranteeing an accused to a right to trial by jury 
and the resulting case law thereunder became applicable to the 
States following the decision of Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 
20 LEd.2d 491 ( 1968) which held in pertinent part: 
The right to jury trial in criminal cases is 
a constitutional right fundamental to the Ameri-
can scheme of justice and is one that is guar-
anteed by the Fourteenth and Sixth Amendments 
to the U.S. Constitution 
Appellant, in the instant case, had his jury effectively waived 
by counsel outside his presence. He did not make a knowing, in-
telligent and voluntary waiver of his fundamental right to have 
a jury trial. Appellant was advised by counsel on Saturday, 
November 24, 1979, just days before trial that he (counsel) had 
walVed the jury in the upcoming criminal trial. Appellant has 
testified that he had not previously discussed the waiver of the 
iury with his appointed counsel. Appellant has further testified 
counsel had not given him an explanation as to the meaning and 
oignificance of his right to trial by jury. The Court failed to ex-
plain to appellant the full significance of that right, and there 
is no other evidence from the record of the trial proceedings to 
substantiate that an explanation had been given to the appellant 
by his counsel or the Court. 
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POINT II I 
APPELLANT DID NOT MAKE A KNOWING, INTEL-
LIGENT AND VOLUNTARY WAIVER OF HIS FUNDA-
MENTAL CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT TO TRIAL BY 
JURY. 
The United States Supreme Court in Patton v. U.S., 281 U.S. 
312, 74 LEd. 854, defined the elements of the constitutional right 
to trial by jury as follows: 
( 1) Jury shall consist of a (specified) number 
of individuals. 
(2) Trial in the presence of a judge and under 
his supervision and the judge instructs the 
jury as to the law and advises them in re-
spect to the facts. 
( 3) The jury shall be unanimous to convict. 
The Court in the Patton case went on to say that in order 
for there to be a waiver of this constitutional right, certain re-
quirements must be met. The federal rules, case law and now the 
new Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure, Section 77-35-17, Utah Code 
Annotated, 1953 as amended, mandate a waiver must include the 
following: 
( 1) The consent of the government counsel. 
( 2) Sanction of the Court. 
(3) Be an express and intelligent consent by 
the accused with the duty of the Court not to 
discharge his constitutional right as a matter 
of rote. 
- 8 -
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l 
The mandate is that the Court must make inquiry to ascer-
tarn whether waiver by the accused is with knowledge, intelligent 
and voluntary. The Court in accepting such a waiver from an ac-
cused of such a fundamental constitutional right as a waiver of 
trail by jury must: 
indulge every reasonable presumption 
against waiver of a fundamental constitutional 
right . See Johnson v. Zerbest, 304 U.S. 
458, 464 ( 1938). 
The Court in Zerbest, went on to state as follows: 
Where there is a proper waiver it should be 
clearly determined by the trial court and it 
would be fitting and appropriate for that de-
termination to appear upon the record. 
The appellant in the case at bar was not given an explana-
tion by defense counsel of his fundamental right to trial by jury. 
Appellant was not present when the waiver was effectively made 
by counsel some days before the scheduled trial date. Appellant 
had been incarcerated in the Juab County Jail and while in cus-
tody had been given drugs to sedate him. Appellant did not 
understand the role of the jury and the requirement of the State 
regarding its burden of proof in jury cases. The appellant has 
had limited dealings with the judicial system. The appellant has 
completed high school, has generally lived in smaller communities 
as opposed to large urban areas and he does little outside read-
ing. He has little background from which to draw information 
- 9 -
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that would assist him in making an intelligent, knowing and 
voluntary waiver of his fundamental constitutional right to trial 
by jury absent a legally acceptable explanation by defense coun-
sel or the judge presiding. 
The record of the proceedings before the Honorable Allen B. 
Sorenson, Judge Presiding of the Fifth Judicial District Court, Juab 
County, State of Utah, is absent of any inquiry that the Court 
indulged in every reasonable presumption against waiver of funda-
mental constitutional rights as required by Zerbest, ibid. The 
official transcript of the criminal trial proceedings, at page 3 
set forth the following exchange which fails to reach the stand-
ard prescribed by the foregoing case law, as follows: 
THE COURT: ls the defendant ready? 
MR. WARNER: Yes, Your Honor. 
have advised my client that he does have 
a right to a jury trial. It's my understanding 
it's his desire to waive such right. 
THE COURT: Have you explained to him the 
full significance of that right? 
MR. WARNER: Well, Your Honor 
cated to him 
have indi-
THE COURT: think you had better question 
him on the record. 
MR. WARNER: Mr. Kennedy, do you realize you 
have the right do you want him sworn first, 
Your Honor? 
THE COURT: Oh, no. No, no. 
- 10 -
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MR. WARNER: 
right to be 
the court? 
You 
tried 
understand you have the 
before a jury rather than 
THE DEFENDANT: Yes, sir. 
MR. WARNER: And you waive that right? 
THE DEFENDANT: Yes, sir. 
THE COURT: You may proceed. 
The language taken from the transcript does not raise to 
the standard of the guidelines and learning given us by Patton, 
ibid., which forbade discharge of a fundamental constitutional 
right as a matter of rote. 
POINT IV 
PREVIALING CASE LAW REQUIRES THAT THE 
COURT HAVE A WRITTEN WAIVER OF CONSTI-
TUTIONAL RIGHT OR MAKE INQUIRY ON THE 
RECORD REGARDING THE KNOWING, INTELLIGENT 
AND VOLUNTARY WAIVER OF A FUNDAMENTAL 
CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT. 
There are few Utah cases that specifically address and rule 
on the issue of knowing, intelligent and voluntary waiver of the 
accused's right to trial by jury. A decision from the Third Judi-
cial District, Salt Lake County, State of Utah, the Honorable 
Ernest F. Baldwin presiding, accepted a defendant's verbal waiv-
er in open Court of his right to trial by jury where defense coun-
sel conducted a thorough examination of defendant's understand-
ing of his constitutional right to trial by jury, and the Court 
made an independent inquiry specifically explaining to the 
- 11 -
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accused the requirement of a unanimous decision by the jury in 
order for there to be a finding of guilty of the charges for which 
the defendant stood accused. 
The explanation given by the Court met the standards des-
cribed by Patton, ibid., see State v. Christian, 533 P2d 872 
(Utah, 1975). 
It is submitted that the prevailing federal case law and the 
case law from surrounding states require a writing to waive the 
constitutional right of jury trial, or if done verbally in open 
Court, the judge must make inquiry of the accused to insure in 
his mind that the accused waiver is expressly and intelligently 
waived. See Hayes v. State, 541 P2d 210 (Oklahoma, 19761, 
McCarthy v. U.S., 394 U.S. 459 (1969), and Heiden v. U.S., 353 
F2d 53 ( ) . The latter federal cases hold as follows: 
That mere recital of ones waiver does not com-
ply with the requirements to waive a fundamen-
tal constitutional right. 
The Utah Supreme Court in earlier decisions, State v. Lopez, 
22 U2d 257, 451 P2d 772 ( 1969), and Barlow v. Young, 108 U2d 
523, 161 P2d 927 ( 1945), have held that it is sufficient to waive 
ones right to jury trial if from the record it was determined as 
follows: 
which provides that the waiver must 
'be made in open court and entered in the 
minutes and the record indicates with sufficient 
clarity that the right was waived' . . The 
matter of trial tactics is not the concern of 
the court, but the defendant and his counsel. 
- 12 -
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It is submitted that the Court in Lopez, ibid., failed to 
understand the significance and impact of the fundamental right 
to trial by jury. The right to trial by jury though a trial tactic 
is nonetheless a fundamental constitutional right that is guaran-
teed by both the United States and State Constitutions. 
Furthermore, the requirement that the record indicates with 
sufficient clarity the right was waived still puts the burden on 
the Court to assure the accused waived his fundamental right 
knowingly, intelligently and voluntarily. 
POINT V 
THE ADEQUACY OF THE COURT RECORD TO DETER-
MINE THE APPROPRIATENESS OF THE STATE 
COURT'S ACCEPTANCE OF A WAIVER OF A FUNDA-
MENTAL CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT IS CONTROLLED 
BY FEDERAL STANDARDS. 
The waiver of a Federal Constitutional Right is governed by 
federal standards. See Douglas v. Alabama, 380 U.S. 14, 13 LEd.2d 
934 ( 1965); no waiver can be presumed from a silent record, see 
Boykin v. Alabama, 395 U.S. 238, 23 LEd.2d 274 (1969), and 
reasonable adherence by state courts of federal mandates must be 
clear from the record to sustain attack for inadequacy, see Garner 
v. Louisiana, 368 U.S. 157, 173, 7 LEd.2d 207 (1961). 
The Court Transcript of the Proceedings and the Court Record 
at the trial below considered in its entirety, fails to comply with 
- 13 -
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the federal standard and it is devoid of sufficient inquiry by the 
Court or counsel written, on the record,, or otherwise, to establish 
that appellant when waiving his fundamental constitutional right 
to trial by jury did so knowingly and voluntarily. 
CONCLUSION 
It is submitted that based on the foregoing cited constitu-
tional sections, statutes, case law and the facts, appellant d\d 
not make an intelligent, knowing and voluntary waiver of his 
right to trial by jury. That based thereon, the order of the 
Third District Court, Salt Lake County, State of Utah, should be 
reversed, and in the alternative, appellant should be granted 
the relief prayed for in his Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus. 
DATED: August 13, 1981. 
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